Liu, Hanlin and Yu, Yimin, Incentives for Shared Services:
Multi-Server Queueing Systems with Priorities (July 15, 2021).
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Forthcoming.
Problem definition: We study shared service whereby multiple
independent service providers collaborate by pooling their resources
into a shared service center (SSC). The SSC deploys an optimal priority
scheduling policy for their customers collectively by accounting for
their individual waiting costs and service level requirements. We model
the SSC as a multi-class M/M/c queueing system subject to service level
Academic/Practical relevance: Shared services
are increasingly popular among firms for saving operational costs and
improving service quality. One key issue in fostering collaboration is
the allocation of costs among different firms.
To incentivize collaboration, we investigate cost allocation rules for
the SSC by applying concepts from cooperative game theory.
To empower our analysis, we show that a cooperative game with
polymatroid optimization can be analyzed via simple auxiliary games. By
exploiting the polymatroidal structures of the multiclass queueing
systems, we show when the games possess a core allocation. We explore
the extent to which our results remain valid for some general cases.
implications: We provide operational insights and guidelines on how to
allocate costs for SSC under the multi-server queueing context with
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